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Logical reflection in early modern philosophy
(EMP) is marked by the instability of the period,
although it is more lasting (the Port-Royal Logic
was nevertheless used as a handbook in philoso-
phy courses until the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury). It started in the sixteenth century and ended
in the nineteenth century, a period of 300 years
during which there were deep transformations
in the conceptions of authority and scientific
method. For the history of twentieth-century phi-
losophy, it was the period of “classical logic,”
which lasted from the Renaissance to the linguis-
tic turn conducted by Gottlob Frege. The period
was used to be thought of as centuries of little or
no original contribution to logic, in which con-
ceptions of logic were tainted by rhetoric, episte-
mology and psychologism in the worst sense
(Kneale and Kneale 1962; Michael 1997). From
the last decades of the twentieth century, however,
scholars began to regard this period more accu-
rately with respect to reflection and changes in
logic and semantics. It has recently become a
promising field for historical and conceptual
research; today we can say that the legacy of
early modern logical reformism has a philosoph-
ical, logical, and semantic value in itself.
There are at least three identifiable phases, so
far, in early modern logical reformism. The first
lasts from the middle of the fifteenth to the begin-
ning of the seventeenth century; it is a period of
unprecedented reflection on the nature of logic,
which is the phase of the Renaissance criticism
and regimentation of the Aristotelian-Thomist
apparatus. In the second phase, there are two
strands – that of rationalism, represented by the
Port-Royal Cartesians, Antoine Arnauld and
Pierre Nicole, and that of empiricism (Manzo’s
entry “▶Empiricism”), represented by Francis
Bacon, Pierre Gassendi, and John Locke. Each
of those conducted the epistemological turn in
the early modern period in their own way. Then
we may identify the third phase, in which the
relationship with science and language is
established on new bases, with Leibniz’s concep-
tion of logic as the most developed expression of
the rationalist strand. In spite of the diversity of
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expressions of logical reformism, the path to be
presented goes from criticism to the conception of
logic as a science of language to a conception of
logic as a science of thought (the epistemological
turn of empiricists and rationalism) and, finally,
to a conception of logic as laws of thought
expressible in a language suitable for translation:
with Leibniz, logic becomes a logical language
of laws of the thought.
Reflection on the Nature of Logic and
Critique of Authority: Renaissance
Reformism
From the beginning of the sixteenth century to the
first half of the seventeenth century, logical
reformism could be mostly characterized as a
reflection on the nature of logic. It concentrated
many expressions of refutation of the medieval
scholasticism and also regimented Aristotle’s
Topics and Rhetoric. The “topical logic” was
used by Renaissance humanists, through criticism
of what scholastic tradition consecrated in its use
in argumentative disputes (the famous Quaestio
Disputata) and, also, in negotiations around ques-
tions of authorities (ecclesiastical, theological,
and political) when some kind of conflict came
into play. That is characteristic of dialectical rea-
soning, in which the syllogism is taken as a dis-
course (Topics 100a25-26) whose nature is not
explanatory but of the rhetorical dispute [in
utramque depart dicendo] aimed at convincing
the interlocutor of a thesis that does not need, at
first, to be true. The nature of this dialectical and
argumentative use is strictly practical and reveals
a displacement of the disputed issue to the civil
dimension toward the public one (Michael 1997;
Wilson 1999).
One of the first representatives of this spectrum
of logical reformism is Lorenzo Valla, in his
Dialectiae Disputatione. Valla’s most significant
contribution to reformism is the method of textual
criticism of classical texts. Inspired by the Latin
translations of the Greek classics, by Boethius’s
De topicis differentiis, which follow Cicero’s con-
ception of logic as “a system of discourse” (ratio
disserendi) (Ashworth 2008), Valla applies the
method of textual criticism (Wilson 1999) and
uncovers a fraud (the episode of the Donation of
Constantine, whose forgery Valla documented in
his De Falso Credita et Ementia Constantini
Donatione Declamatio, in 1439). In doing so, he
indicates a path of criticism of authority and ends
up bringing the state of the arts to a search for a
criterion of the truth. That will be accomplished
by Rudolf Agricola. Agricola focused his
approach of logic as invention, which becomes
the material of what will be judged. So the valid
inference begins to depend on a relationship
between inventio and dispositio, in which this
latter takes the place of judgment. The elements
of inference, however, are purposefully vague
constants, to be determined through dispute or
by learning rhetoric. In 1479, he published De
Inventione Dialectica; in it, he introduced the
requirement for a veritative criterion (Ashworth
2008).
Petrus Ramus or Pierre de la Ramée, is the
most prominent figure of this reformist phase.
Ramus rejects the concept of logic as a demon-
stration and defends logic as an art of speaking
well (ars bene disserendi), in his work
Dialectique, from 1555. For Ramus, logic is a
practical discipline, in which sorites paradoxes
constitute a paradigm in training, without worry-
ing about formal (and ontological) structures.
Ramus’ reputation, as well as his influence, was
immense. The aggressiveness with which he
addressed Aristotelian logic also became notori-
ous. On the other hand, he is not recognized as a
contributor in any way to logic, and his relevant
role, if any, is, rather, as a pedagogical reformer. It
is in that condition that the practical and discur-
sive turn of Renaissance logic is understood. At
the time of the formation of national states, edu-
cational reforms were conflicting with a formally
sophisticated logic that had allegedly no practical
applicability. Ramus was one of the most famous
Huguenot figures murdered on St. Bartholomew’s
Night. It is possible that his murder in these cir-
cumstances explains the expansion of the influ-
ence of hisDialecticae (Kneale and Kneale 1962).
The pedagogical legacy of Ramus may be seen
in the work of the Lutheran Philip Melanchthon.
The Protestant Reformation introduced new
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practical, theological, and philosophical chal-
lenges in logical reflection as well. Melanchthon
in 1521 wrote Loci Communes, and, in his Opera
Omnia, Erotemata Dialectices, he offers a con-
ception of logic as the ars recte, ordine et precipue
docendi: the art of correct, orderly, and perspicu-
ous teaching. This approach concentrates three
separate elements in Renaissance conceptions of
logical reformism: logic becomes a discursive art,
that is, an argumentative practice, and logic
assumes a veritative commitment and is, above
all, something that is taught, that is transmitted.
This third aspect is what points to the epistemic
trait in logical reflection. The truth is not just
discourse-dependent of an authority quarrel; it
turns to the social demand linked to the birth of
national states, in which the transmission and the
reflection on the nature of knowledge came into
play. Melanchthon exerted great influence on
another reformer, the Calvinist theologian
Bartholomäus Keckermann. For Keckermann,
logic is defined as firstly the ars dirgens mentem
in cognitione rerum, that is, the art which directs
the mind in the cognition of things, and, secondly,
the ars recte de rebus cogitandi, the art of thinking
rightly about things. This second definition sug-
gests the influence Melanchthon exercised over
Keckermann and a change in the conception of
logic, from a linguistic to an epistemological con-
ception (Michael 1997).
To affirm that logic is a “linguistic” discipline
or that it is linked to a language is not to say that
there are not, nor can there be, in logic, epistemic
requirements. One of the most peculiar reformists
that challenge this claim is Jacopo Zabarella, from
the Aristotelian School of Padua, a great exponent
among those who preserved the root of demon-
stration of the Aristotelian Organon. He aligns
with the Aristotelian method, despite the nuances
of his conception of induction, of efficient causal-
ity, and of the relationship between logic and
science. Among the logicians influenced by him
is Johannes Jungius (1587–1657), who studied in
Padua and developed a conception of logic as a
mental art leading to the discernment of truth from
falsity (Mikkeli 1992).
Zabarella’s role is doubly important: from the
historical point of view, it is possible to identify at
the Aristotelian School of Padua the origin and
preservation of a classicism which is somewhat a
survivor of the rhetorical Renaissance play with
little logical relevance. From the conceptual point
of view, while insisting that logic would be a
theoretical discipline, even if instrumental,
Zabarella may be said to have ensured the legacy
of the Aristotelian method of demonstration. And
he also seems to have inspired Galileo to think
about the problems of the method entailed by the
difficulty of the “law of regress,” as he investi-
gates in the Tractatio de Demonstratione, his first
work in logic (Mikkeli 1992).
The Epistemological Turn: Early Modern
Rationalists and Empiricists
The second phase of early modern logical reform-
ism has two strands of method: rationalism and
empiricism. Both criticize the demonstrative root
of the Aristotelian Organon. Although traces of
the epistemic turn can be found in the throes of the
first reformist phase and in the School of Padua, it
in fact originates from two events: the impact of
Galileo’s condemnation on René Descartes’
thinking (Friedman, 2008) and the publication of
The New Organon (1640) by Francis Bacon.
Bacon is less of a logical reformist than a philos-
opher of the New Science. He developed the con-
cept of induction by elimination as the main rule
of the experimental method. For both sides,
knowledge must precede demonstration; what is
at stake in logical reflection is the most suitable
method for demonstrating the truth discovered as
certainty. Both strands have cultivated similar
critical concerns, but the responses offered by
each are very different and mark the division of
the epistemological turn.
The central figure in the epistemological turn is
Descartes, in the wake of the Galilean project.
And even though Descartes took the experimental
method seriously and should be considered a phi-
losopher of nature and not a logical reformer, his
contribution to logical reflection is inseparable
from the impact of Galileo’s condemnation in
1632. Until then, Descartes was more involved
in the “universal mathematization” project
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(Friedman 2008; Smith 2010). In 1637, Descartes
launched the Discourse on Method, which would
be the introduction to prudently unpublished
texts, and in 1641, the Metaphysical Meditations.
In these texts, we can verify another path, that of
an epistemology characterized by reflection on
representations, representations through which
two elements are introduced: (1) the response to
skepticism with a logical and epistemic subjectiv-
ity able to open new ground for the foundation of
science and (2) a theory of ideas and judgment
reflecting the (still ongoing) change of the onto-
logical landscape. For Descartes, in the Rules
(AT, X, 405), the prescription of models of syllo-
gistic reasoning for the demonstration of science
could serve for the “reason at rest,” instead of
considering an inference “particularly and atten-
tively.” While the first phase of reformism is
marked by a certain abandonment of unity in the
inferential chain (and the defense of enunciative
structures of rhetoric and of commonplaces), this
second phase points to a return to units of meaning
on a new ground, an epistemic one, for inference.
And while Descartes has a form of subjectivity
and method anchored in a theory of representa-
tion, Bacon opens another way to replace that of
Aristotelian syllogism: induction by elimination.
The empiricist strand arises from the defense of
the replacement of a demonstration model by a
projection model, based on the hypothesis resis-
tant to falsification.
The elimination of teleology of the scientific
explanatory programs occurs in both strands.
Thus, the belief that there would be some “antic-
ipation” in the essence of beings, which will be
reflected in the demonstration of science, is aban-
doned by Bacon, who takes the fact that there
is only one description very seriously (as does
Galileo), and suggests that also “human knowl-
edge and power are one: for, where the cause is
not known, the effect cannot be produced” (New
Organon, L, III). The teleological path is replaced
by the operation of rule, aimed at commanding
nature after having obeyed it (Wilson 1999). The
logical thinking linked to Bacon’s empiricism is
not focused on the organization of ideas but on
rules inferred from a projection well-informed and
resistant to falsification. The limits of the
projection are the limits of actual knowledge,
verified through a procedure of elimination by
discovery, not of the true, but of what is false.
The method of induction by elimination is not
yet, though, a logical method but the search for
articulating the appropriate way to deal with sci-
ence from epistemic and experimental require-
ments. As Wilson (1999) says: “We are
presented with a range of jointly exhaustive and
mutually exclusive hypotheses; data are presented
which eliminate all but one of the range; it is
concluded that the remaining hypothesis is to be
affirmed as true. It is this method that is charac-
teristic of the new science. (p. 5).” It follows that
the premise resistant to verification of the hypoth-
eses of the experiment is true.
In early modern logical reformism, the great
representative of empiricism is Pierre Gassendi,
who also wrote a logic of ideas, Institutio Logica
(1658). According to Michael (1997), this manual
of Gassendi’s logic of ideas greatly influenced the
most famous and tenacious manual of modernity
logic, which is Logic, or, The Art of Thinking, the
so-called Port-Royal Logic (Antoine Arnauld &
Pierre Nicole, 1683, Translated by Buroker,
1996). Despite the similarity of the presentation
of Gassendi’s logic to that of Port-Royal, and also
the shared criticisms of scholastics, there is little
left in common. For Gassendi, before coming into
contact with Epicurus’ philosophy, logic would be
useless. Then (Michael 1997), he reformulates his
view toward it: for logic to be anything other than
the result of a disputed and unsuccessful argu-
ment, it must become useful, and, therefore, it
needs to be reformed.
This reform happens through a theory of signs.
Gassendi’s conception of the sign brings it closer
to a logic of the imagination, insofar as the sign
originates from sensible experience and consti-
tutes itself as an image of what is hidden in nature
or in extra-mental reality. Ideas are signs of two
kinds: the empirical ones, originating from the
senses whose conceptual nature is “hidden” in
nature (e.g., smoke, which is a sign of fire), and
the indicative, which depend on the image we
form from our senses. These images are the mate-
rial for the inference; it provides what Gassendi
formulates as appropriate anticipation: the
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prolepses. Logic is defined as the art of thinking
well – ars bene cogitant. Thinking well is devel-
oping skills: imagine well, present the proposition
well, infer well, and order well. The text has four
Parts, corresponding to ideas, propositions, rea-
soning, and method. Each part is focused on train-
ing the corresponding skills (representing,
judging, demonstrating, and ordering). As
Lolordo observes (2005), Gassendi read theMeta-
physical Meditations as a treatise on logic and
opposed Descartes’ logical rule: the general rule
of truth. According to him, the Cartesian general
rule of truth – “everything that I perceive clearly
and distinctly is true” – explained in the Third
Meditation, lacks criteria, and, therefore, its
method as a whole leads to failure. Gassendi
remains skeptical about the ability of thought or
the purely conceptual way to get to the truth. The
empiricist strand commits to epistemic rules
linked to the accuracy of knowledge and methods
for the new programs of explanation of nature,
according to the new science whose ultimate cri-
terion derives from data provided by the senses.
On the other hand, the rationalists focused
mainly on judgments. Their paradigmatic logic
handbook takes judgment as the mental act
which defines logic. It is the Logic of Port-Royal
or Logic, or, The Art of Thinking (1683), the most
celebrated and tenacious logic manual in the
history of modern philosophy, which was in
the curricula of logic courses until the end of the
nineteenth century, when it was buried as the great
representative of semantic psychologism.
Logic or the Art of Thinking (The Logic of
Port-Royal)
The Abbey of Port-Royal housed, in reformist
France, the Jansenists, a Catholic dissent that
advocated a return to Augustine. The main link
connecting Descartes and the Jansenists is pro-
vided by Antoine Arnauld, a central figure in
Port-Royal, as well as the influencee of the
Augustinian method of ascension, by Descartes,
after 1633, when he learned of Galileo’s condem-
nation (Friedman 2008; Hatfield 1997). That was
a method of reflection on one’s own thoughts and
suspicion of what is accessed by the senses, which
recommends that the knowledge of God is
achieved through the knowledge of oneself: intro-
spection precedes knowledge of the outside world
and to some extent conditions it. The measure of
the latter is that of the ground of knowledge
reached in the Cartesian response to skepticism,
with the cogito argument. The argument “I think,
therefore I am” has several expressions and it is
not just an argument, but a state of one’s own
mind’s attention, that is, a state of mind (Carriero
2008; Levy 2017). For Descartes and also for the
authors of Port-Royal, the cogito is a frontier: it is
a point of arrival in response to skepticism, and it
is a point from which the Meditations of an epi-
stemic subject (a form of subjectivity) will be
taken forward. For the Augustinians of Port-
Royal, the cogito is a theological starting point.
In both cases, the privilege of epistemic access to
the senses is replaced by the mental activity of a
logical subject.
A major representative of the paradigm that
became the target of the so-called linguistic turn
from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the
Port-Royal Logic would be nothing more than
semantic psychologism. It seems irrelevant to
note that the project of burying the presence of
the logical subject and, more incisively, any epi-
stemic and eventually semantic residue of logic, in
its mathematical expression, remains incomplete.
In fact, as Hanna notes (1991), “the relative lack
of understanding the foundations of the thesis of
semantic psychologism (and, consequently both
the ‘staying power’ of the thesis despite repeated
criticism, and the disagreement as to the correct
antithesis of the thesis) is due ultimately to the
failure to identify accurately its historical ori-
gins.” (p. 776). According to this reading, the
central problems that occupied the post-Fregean
semantics is no more than would of the central
problems of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century epistemology (Hanna 1991; Hacking
1975; Kretzmann 1967). Be that as it may, it is
not nearly as easy to establish a fair and enlight-
ened assessment of the nature of logic and judg-
ment when the roots of the actual objects are
clarified as part of a real philosophical inquiry,
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that is to say, that it deserved a history of investi-
gation into it.
As we will see, the Port-Royal Logic may and
should be taken as a real logical handbook, strictly
speaking. For Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, authors
of the Port-Royal Logic, its form aligns with a
voluntarist thinking. The cogito gives itself the
objects of thinking: the ideas (Traité des Vraies
et Fausses Idées – VFI, 2) and their objects are
always internal to the representational infrastruc-
ture. The reformists’ logical texts had the appear-
ance of the medieval logic of terms. In this model,
terms are the elements of the utterances in a syl-
logism (be it a demonstration of science or rhe-
toric). Terms are categories and propositions that,
chained in syllogisms, are at the service of dem-
onstrating the truth or falsehood, the consistency
or the inconsistency of reasoning. The logic of
terms before Port-Royal and Gassendi does not
require any epistemic content. In this way, the
demonstration is an instrument (an Organon) to
state the validity or consistency of reasoning
according to rules that would mirror or translate
a stable ontological landscape (Aristotelian-
Thomist).
In the new Cartesian landscape, there are two
substances, each one with only one attribute:
thought is the attribute of the immaterial sub-
stance, and extension is that of the material one.
A perspective enters the scene in which access and
description of the world come to depend on purely
rational rules, reducible to adequate representa-
tions and judgments of epistemic and logical sub-
jects. The Arnauldian conception of logic,
however, responds to the ontological instability
engendered by Descartes’s (and Galileo’s) pro-
ject, with a subtle strategy. In Logic, or, The Art
of Thinking, what is at stake is not a metaphysical
grounding of physics, but the formation, through
education, of logical and moral subjects who
should be up to the task of re-founding Christian-
ity, according to the rules of Jansenius and their
radical interpretation of the Augustinian doctrines
of grace and original sin. They have a global
consistency of method, articulating theology, ped-
agogy, grammar, and logic. The handbook, which
has four Parts and had five editions while the
authors were alive, has an informative title,
Logic, or, the Art of Thinking. Besides common
rules, it contains several new observations appro-
priate for forming judgment.
The twofold traits in the handbook’s title must
be taken seriously. To interpret logic as a mental
practice the way Port-Royal does is to take it as
subsidiary to the Augustinian cogito and to the
Cartesian theory of representation. In Discourse
II, with which they opened the second edition in
1664, the authors responded to the criticisms of
the first edition, with a statement about what they
considered as logic – “the purpose of logic is to
give us rules for all actions of the mind, and for
simple ideas as well as for judgments and infer-
ences” – and then they complement: “there is
practically no other word which covers all these
different acts. Certainly, ‘thinking’ includes all of
them” (LAP, Trad. Buroker, p. 15). Logic, there-
fore, establishes rules for mental actions, because
ideas, for Jansenists, are perceptual mental actions
(VFI, 4). Logic, for Arnauld and Nicole, “is the art
of conducting reason well, as much to instruct
ourselves about them as to instruct others”
(p. 23). While it perceives, the mind represents
(VFI, 27); the very act of perceiving is, by itself,
an idea, from the idea and the idea. Ideas are
always mental operations which may be represen-
tational or not (AT, VII, 37). When, however, the
idea represents, one should expect to have an
intentional counterpart of the idea, that is, its
object. Then, we may say that the representational
structure is twofold: on the one hand, the idea is a
modification of thought (it is a mental act that
takes the form of a mode of thought) and, on the
other hand, it is an object of perception (it is a
thought modified by another thought). For
Arnauld and in Port-Royal Logic, this counterpart
is never extramental, so the object is always an
object of and is in the same representative idea
(Nadler 1998).
The “I think” has two kinds of ideas: simple
and complex ones (which are a composition of at
least two ideas, as in “Alexander is Philip’s son”
and “Alexander is Philip’s son and is a con-
queror”; simply “Alexander” would then be just
a simple idea). We could take these ideas
according to their objects: things, mode or manner
of a thing, and modified thing, that is to say, ideas,
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attributes, and adjectives (or attributes of attri-
butes). The attributive structure of the handbook
is apparently traditional, of the “S is A” type. As
the epistemic domain is always virtually present,
however, this structure may sound a bit deceptive,
for one of the landmarks of this reformist project
is the contempt for language. Many of the criti-
cisms of its psychologism and vagueness are due
to the neglect of this parti pris running through the
text. Contempt for language is consistent with
the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, which
informs the semantics and the relationship
between ideas and terms, terms and propositions,
and propositions and judgment and between the
procedures of restriction (Buroker 1996; Pariente
1985), of the handbook.
In this doctrine, the Fall led to the discovery of
the embodied desiring condition, which entails
opacity among minds that were hitherto transpar-
ent to each other. So, the use of words and lan-
guage stems from a sinful and, therefore, less
reliable condition. In Port-Royal, this is a theory
about the relationship between thought and lan-
guage, about the etiology and “posology” of lan-
guage. Therein lies the foundation of the priority
of thinking over the use of words and also of the
idea over the linguistic expressions. This is the
explanation for the fact that, despite being a logic
of terms, the Jansenist handbook may be taken as
a logic of ideas, in the first place. That is because
in it, terms need not correspond to ideas in a one-
to-one relationship. In a proper sense, neither
terms nor judgments are ideas, and this is not
clear to an external reader, because authors often
seem to treat terms as ideas and vice versa (after
all, they do not care very much about the expres-
sions used). Thus, when the authors say, in the
complement of the title “containing, besides com-
mon rules, several new observations appropriate
for forming judgment,” they are explaining the
hybrid structure that makes this text so peculiar:
there is an appearance of logic of terms; there is
the presentation of Aristotle’s categories and also
of the five universals, the Third Part, which is the
largest one of the manual, is dedicated to the
syllogism; however, mentioning and using these
expressions is equivalent to using a dead horse
carcass to hide or warm up. Semantics, applied by
a logical and epistemic subjectivity, is parasitic on
the conception of the art of thinking, which means
inference by reflection.
These elements explicit the constituents of the
handbook. The order of presentation of what will
be within sheltered the logical terms (subject and
attribute) is as follows: ideas are the minimum
epistemic units (which is not the same as the unit
of meaning) (First Part, 1), ideas have intra-mental
objects, and it is in this condition that they have
any logical relevance, that is, in their plasticity:
ideas are things, manners of things, and modified
things (First Part, 2). Aristotle’s ten categories are
mentioned to “show” their irrelevance, the way
they are a “pure carcass” (First Part, 3). Ideas have
a formal sign nature (First Part, 4): ideas are ways
of thinking about something. From the duplicity
of ideas rises the possibility of considering them
in their compositionality or simplicity when intro-
ducing two modes of thought: abstraction and
specification (First Part, 5).
Abstraction allows for generalization. Exam-
ples of abstraction: the “I” comprises the “I think”;
the equilateral triangle comprises the triangle. But
both the “I” and the “triangle” are “less deter-
mined” and, therefore, can represent more indi-
viduals. Now, simple ideas represent just one
thing, an individual, whereas general or common
ideas represent more than one individual. The
complexity of the representational infrastructure
will be instantiated in ordinary language, in which
thought is “marked” through the names of indi-
viduals. We identify general ideas and simple
ideas by the markings in the language, or by the
“nomination” of the individual or the individuals
represented. Thus, Socrates, Rome, and
Bucephalus are names of individuals, whereas
Man, City, and Horse are common names which
can represent several individuals. Common names
can be ambiguous, and for this reason, the authors
require attention to the introduction of a semanti-
cally oriented look at the two modes of using
common names.
The first use is univocal: it should be consid-
ered that common ideas are univocally used when
referring to one thing. For example: “horse,”
“city,” “man” may be taken as common names
with univocal use. Then, the common name
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“horse” refers to the idea of horses in general or to
the idea of individual horses (that is, indepen-
dently of its nomination); or “city” refers to the
idea of city, in only one sense that is applied to an
idea of a city as such. The use is univocal because
the names referred to individuals or to classes of
individuals as if it were one and only kind of
thing, namely, the idea falling under this common
name, with one single possible meaning. The sec-
ond use is equivocal: it involves different uses of
the same word the sense of which is a pragmati-
cally fixed meaning, in a context of speakers. That
is to say: the second use is plunged within the
natural language. The latter opens a space to
understand, in the treatment of singular terms,
how it is possible to grasp the boundary of logical
space in the representational domain. The use of
equivocal expressions expounds, then, the logical
space, if we orient ourselves through a semantic
rule: the Port-Royal Law, which will be explored
below. Due to the possible gap between the form
of representation and the object represented
means that some regulation of restriction is
needed (First Part, 6).
Each idea has at least one comprehension and
may also have an extension. The comprehension
of an idea is made up of attributes without which it
is not thinkable. The extension of an idea is that to
which the comprehension of that idea applies, be
it an individual or groups. Through the semantic
distinction between comprehension and extension
of the idea, we may grasp its implications. The
extension denotes the individual or individuals to
which the comprehension of the idea applies
to. The extension requires rules to restrict the
idea. The extension of an idea can be restricted
when a determination is added to a general idea,
for example, when the idea of a triangle is added
to that of a right triangle. One may also restrict an
idea by adding a quantifier such as “some” to the
comprehension of the general idea. Thus, when
thinking about a triangle, we say “some” triangle.
This type of determination or restriction is called
an “indistinct” and “indeterminate” restriction
(First Part, 6).
Here is the Port-Royal Law: the greater the
comprehension, the smaller the extent of an idea
is. And the lower the comprehension, the greater
the extent of a general idea is. This can be trans-
lated as follows: the fewer attributes an idea has,
to more individuals may its objective reality (i.e.,
its comprehension) be applied to. The more
abstract and general it is, the less particular it
is. This is not trivial, however, because (1) the
individuals to which general or common ideas
apply are not pre-determined in any extra-
representational reality and (2) comprehension is
neither an essence of a substance nor an element
external to thought, but an idea of an idea: it is,
therefore, a strictly semantic disposition. For
example, the idea of a square circle has no com-
prehension (it fails to have any possible meaning)
and, therefore, cannot have any extension, first of
all, because without comprehension there can be
no extension.
The reverse does not happen, though: ideas can
be comprehended without any extension: I can
think of a table with a turtle shell and call it
“turtable.” I can have an idea of a table and an
idea of a turtle shell; then, I may very well com-
pose both of these ideas: a table whose top is a
turtle shell. However, as far as I can tell, there is no
extension of this idea. The “turtable” (say, the
name of that combination) is an idea, bearer of a
comprehension, without any extension whatso-
ever. The intelligibility of the handbook is guided
by its method requirements. It also recommends
taking language as somewhat a bitter medicine.
The use of language to mark epistemic thoughts
and content obeys, in some cases, a sort of peace
agreement. Thus, the intertwined relationship
between logic and grammar governs propositions,
judgments, and predicates, eventually with the
structure of past propositions being used as actual
terms, as merely complex ideas housed by some
term function (First Part, 8 and Second Part, from
4–14).
For example:
1. The turtable is used in an official ceremony
S (¼ The turtable) is A (¼ used in an official
ceremony)
We may see two complex ideas there (mere
composition of two simple ideas) side by side:
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(a) A turtable is a complex idea and, at the same
time, is a simple term: the subject of proposi-
tion (1).
(b) It is an attribute which may be taken as a
complex idea, that is to say, the combination
of two ideas: the idea of official and the idea of
ceremony. Together, these ideas may seem to
be just a term, but within it there is an already
made judgment, due to the propositional con-
tent of the attribute. There is an official cere-
mony, accordingly, because the judgment “the
ceremony is official” is implicit in an attribute
in which it plays the role of a logical term,
sheltering a complex idea.
If we analyze the turtable following the rules
expressed in Chap. 5 of the Second Part, we are
compelled to consider its logical nature and con-
stituents as expressing a judgment. This would go
like the table is made of a turtle shell as its cover.
When enunciated in (1), however, the copula does
not behave as such, for it is implicit; that is to say,
complex ideas with propositional content can play
different logical roles as terms (that is not to say
that judgments may be subjects and attributes but
that in each term-S and in each term-A there could
be n ideas and, so, n ideas with propositional,
therefore judicative contents). Thus, the former
judgment reveals itself as a simple term, a subject,
in an actual proposition, as part of a judgment in
the condition of a complex idea sheltered by a
logical term. The proposition (1) may also be
analyzed grammatically:
2. The turtable, that is, a turtle shell table, is used
in a ceremony, which is official
Complex ideas with propositional content can
play the role of incidental propositions, like the
one inserted by the relative pronouns (“that” and
“which”) included above. Given the possible gap
between ideas and terms, an S-term can harbor an
n number of ideas, and the same occurs in the
attribute function. That dynamic of incidental
propositions makes the distribution of the truth
values problematic and seems to weaken the clas-
sic structure of the proposition (Buroker 1997),
due to the possibility of repeated recursion
(Buroker 1996) in the handbook. But that seems
to be somewhat treatable, should the methodolog-
ical requirements be taken seriously.
A proposition is the union or separation of at
least two ideas (Second Part, 3), and, they say
next, this operation is also called judgment.
Then, they clarify: it is not enough to conceive
the two ideas or two terms, because it is necessary
that the spirit connects or separates them. This
connection or separation is made by the “I think,”
and so the boundary between propositional space
and assertoric stroke can govern incident and
principal propositions. That is how it can be
“enough that there is an express or virtual judg-
ment or statement” (Second Part, 7) to decide
whether or when incidental propositional compo-
nents distribute their true value to a total judgment
or not.
The comprehension of the subject includes the
comprehension of the predicate, and the extension
of the predicate is the quantified part of the prop-
osition (Buroker 1997). When it is said, then, that
if S is P, that carries an elementary identity
between subject and attribute; according to Port-
Royal, it would have in fact this: all a is b which is
a, or, still, all a is (some) b. Quantifiers are syn-
categorematic expressions in Port-Royal. The
idea of an attribute then is not taken according to
its extension, unless its extension is greater than
that of the attribute (as in the case of “they are
animals,” in the proposition “all men are animals”
since the extension “animals” is greater than that
of men so that the reason “all men are animals”
should be taken as “all men are (some) animals”).
That kind of implicit quantification reinforces the
strength of the method in the manual and nuances
the “classic logical” character of the handbook.
There is no identity between subject and predi-
cate, but an asymmetric relationship between
components of judgment. This asymmetry
makes their theory of copula another curious
example of its hybrid character, regarding the
conditions for a “peace agreement” between the
domains of thought and language, in the most
famous seventeenth-century logical text.
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Leibniz’s Conception of Logic: The
Development of the Rationalist Path
As occurs with Leibniz’s metaphysics, the Leib-
nizian conception of logic can only be understood
in a satisfactory and comprehensive way if we
take into account that it consists, to a certain
extent, in a reaction to the concept of logic
expressed or tacitly accepted by modern philoso-
phers as Francis Bacon, René Descartes, and
Antoine Arnauld. Leibniz disagrees, first of all,
with the strongly negative evaluation of
Aristotelian-scholastic logic which is based on
its alleged sterility and uselessness with regard
both to setting up first truths that could serve as
foundational bases of the sciences and to making
discoveries that contribute to an effective expan-
sion of the field of knowledge. He also does not
understand it as a mere instrument that provides us
with only valid rules of inference, although, of
course, it also fulfills this function. Secondly,
Leibniz deeply disagrees with an epistemic under-
standing of logic, which can be found, in an
exemplary way, in Logic, or, The Art of Thinking.
In this book Arnauld and Nicole present what they
call a new logic, which contains investigations on
the rules of good thinking through an investiga-
tion on the operations of the spirit. The main goal
of these investigations is making it possible to
avoid the mistakes that we make day after day
and that keep us from discovering the truth.
Therefore, the Port-Royalian logic is structured
around the four mental operations attributed to
understanding, namely, conceiving, judging, rea-
soning, and ordering, unveiling the rules of
thought specific to each of these operations. It is
because of an assumed anteriority and indepen-
dence of thought in relation to language that Port-
Royalian logic takes the operations of thought as
the object of study of logic.
It is true that, in several of his texts (GP VII,
82–85; and 514–527), throughout his life, Leibniz
also characterizes logic as being an art of think-
ing – l´art de bien penser, ars cogitandi,
Denkkunst, Vernunftkunst (L, 463; GP VII,
516) – but it is important to emphasize that this
art does not involve, in Leibniz, a description or
an investigation neither on mental entities located
in the spirit nor on mental operations executed by
it. Rather, it deals with the settlement or discovery
of the rules for the formation of symbols and with
the execution of operations that enable us
to deduce certain propositions from others. For
Leibniz, it is not possible to think without using
signs of some kind (L., p. 183), in such a way that
these formation rules for concepts, judgments,
and reasoning must be understood as referring to
operations on signs. So thinking consists in cal-
culating, being nothing more than a manipulation
of signs according to certain rules. In this way, the
development of an art of thinking is, in Leibniz,
inevitably linked to the establishment of a general
doctrine of signs, that is, of a semiotics, and a
doctrine that institutes laws that determine these
operations.
This characterization of logic as an art of think-
ing coexists, in Leibniz’s texts, with the statement
that logic consists in a science, more specifically,
in a general science (scientia generalis). The rela-
tionship between these two conceptions – ars
cogitandi and scientia generalis – does not corre-
spond either to a temporal evolution in Leibnizian
thinking about logic, given that both conceptions
are equally present in texts after the 1680s, or to a
possible equivocality in the use of the term “logic”
by Leibniz, which would indicate that he would
use this term to designate things that would not
have any kind of internal link between them.
Rather, they are, in our view, two somewhat com-
plementary perspectives on what logic is. From a
methodological or instrumental perspective, logic
presents itself as the simple art of thinking,
containing, on the one hand, the rules to be
followed for a correct deduction – ars judicandi –
and, on the other hand, those that should allow
discoveries, ars invenienda. From a doctrinal
point of view, however, it appears as an area of
⁣⁣knowledge in its own sense, that is, not only
as a set of rules to be adopted for knowing cor-
rectly but as a subject matter to be known itself.
The scope of that which logic deals with is as wide
as possible, leading Leibniz, in some texts, to
identify it, ultimately, with metaphysics.
Leibniz’s admiration for Aristotle as a logician
stems not only from the recognition of the value of
the results he reached but mainly from the fact
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that, for him, Aristotle was the first to think of
non-mathematical objects in a completely formal
way, which enabled him to construct demonstra-
tions out of mathematics (C, 177). In a letter to
Gabriel Wagner, in 1696, Leibniz states that “it is
certainly no small matter that Aristotle reduced
these forms to unerring laws, having been the first
to actually write mathematically outside of math-
ematics” (l, 465). What belongs to logic is, there-
fore, for Leibniz, the formulation of proofs and
demonstrations that work by virtue of their form,
and not because of their matter or the content of
propositions. Leibniz considers Aristotelian syl-
logistics as the first achievement in this area, but
“it is simply unnecessary for all forms of proof to
be labeled omnis, atque, and ergo. Into all infalli-
ble sciences that are exactly demonstrated, higher
logical forms are incorporated, some of which
come from Aristotle, some of which must find
their source elsewhere” (L, 465). Thus, the
Aristotelian-Thomistic syllogistics, far from
encompassing the totality of logic, consists, for
Leibniz, of a calculation that involves certain log-
ical forms, but not all possible forms.
One of the main goals pursued by Leibniz in
the course of his work is precisely a critical inves-
tigation of the principles and laws on which log-
ical calculations are based. It makes possible, on
the one hand, to give strict reasons for the existing
symbolic calculations and, on the other hand, to
formulate new calculations involving the discov-
ery and development of other logical forms. Thus,
it is a project to expand traditional logic by devel-
oping more general and broader calculations. In
his strictly logical texts, written mostly between
1679 and 1690, Leibniz pursued two different but
connected goals: (a) to substantiate the syllogis-
tics, establishing basic laws from which the syllo-
gisms derive, and (b) to develop different
calculations with the final purpose of formulating
a universal calculation, which would then provide
the formal framework for the most diverse argu-
ments. Among these calculations, we can identify
(a) a calculus of concepts, developed within Gen-
eral Inquiry about the Analysis of Concepts and
Truths (P, 47–87), from 1686; (b) the development
of a quantifiable system which, besides quantify-
ing concepts, introduces a quantification of indi-
viduals, also in General Inquiry; and (c) the
calculation known as “plus-minus-calculus,”
introduced in the text A Not Inelegant Specimen
of Abstract Proof (P, 122–130), which consists in
a calculation that mainly involves addition and
subtraction operations, which are abstractly
understood. A notable exhibition and reconstruc-
tion of these calculations can be found in
Wolfgang Lenzen’s masterful works (Lenzen
1990, 2004a, b).
This leads Leibniz to consider logic as being a
scientia generalis (C, 556), understanding under
that term a science that contains the principles of
all other sciences as well as the method for using
these principles, which would enable the discov-
ery and establishment of truths in all areas (A, VI,
4–32). For this project to be implemented, this
scientia generalis must be linked, on the one
side, to a characteristica universalis, that is, to a
universal doctrine of signs, whose task is to build
a formal language that expresses the conceptual
relations established by scientia generalis. This
characteristica must have basic terms that corre-
spond to the basic elements that make up our
thinking, thus forming both a kind of alphabet of
thoughts and a syntax related to its connection
laws. On the other side, it must also be linked to
an encyclopaedia, whose materials or contents
will be systematically linked to one other, consti-
tuting a demonstrative encyclopedia.
The universal nature of scientia generalis
inevitably takes it closer to metaphysics, leading
Leibniz, at times, to even identify one with each
other (see, e.g., the letter from November 1678, to
Countess Elizabeth: car j’ay reconnu que laMeta-
physique n’est gueres differente de la vraye
Logique, c’est à dire de l’art d’inventer en
general: A, II, 1, 662–663). The point is that
Leibniz also understands scientia generalis as a
science of what is thought as such (Scientia
Generalis nihil aliud est quam Scientia de
Cogitabili in universum quatenus tale est; A, VI,
4, 527), that is, of what can be conceived without
contradiction. As, for Leibniz, being is everything
that can be thought of in a logically consistent
way, so a science of what is thinkable coincides
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with the science of beings or things in general. In
that way, logic, as a scientia generalis, ends up
corresponding to metaphysics, understood as a
formal and general ontology.
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